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1 Introduction: What? Now.
I’d like to thank Regina Fabry for her excellent
and detailed response to my paper. She articu-
lates an important account of reading acquisition
as a process of enculturation and describes how a
Cognitive  Integration/Enculturated  Cognition
(henceforth CI/ENC) account can be combined
with  a  predictive  processing  account  of  neural
processing. She shows, in impressive detail, how
CI/ENC can benefit from Predictive Processing
(henceforth PP), primarily as a way of explaining
the neural-level details of processes that conspire
with bodily interactions with the local environ-
ment to complete cognitive tasks. Since Fabry’s
response suggests an important way of  cashing
out some of the details of an enculturated ap-
proach, I would like to take this opportunity to
look at some of the potential pitfalls in the pro-
posed  Enculturated  Predictive  Processing  style
(henceforth EPP). Primarily I want to focus on
the differences in explanatory emphasis between
CI/ENC and PP, especially where CI/ENC pro-
poses the importance of the population-level ef-
fects of normative patterned practices (henceforth
NPP), such as mathematical practices. 
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PP is all about predictions, happening in
the here-and-now1; however CI/ENC occurs at
different  levels  and  over  much  longer  time-
scales. It turns out that this difference is  im-
portant, because if the brain is engaged in pre-
dictive error minimization (as sub-personal pro-
cessing) in the here-and-now, then it cannot be
driving the innovation of new NPP over many
generations. This is because the pressures driv-
ing those innovations are found at the social, or
populational,  level2,  not at the level of  neural
processing  where  ‘what?’  is  answered  in  the
now. 
I  also  raise  several  issues concerning the
nature of the PP project, particularly whether,
as  a  theory  of  general  brain  architecture,  all
processing can be cashed out in terms of pre-
dictive  processes.  I’m  also  sceptical  about
Fabry’s claim that PP can provide the “mech-
anistic underpinnings of the acquisition of cog-
nitive practices” (Fabry this volume, p. 3) on its
own,  without  help  from what  I  call  learning-
driven  plasticity  (LDP)  and  neural  redeploy-
ment. Finally, I comment on the promising re-
search path down which Fabry is headed.
In the first section I remind the reader of
some of the leading ideas of the CI/ENC frame-
work,  highlighting,  in  particular,  the  different
levels of  explanation and how this matters to
the  proposed  marriage  of  ENC-PP.  In  the
second section I raise several problems for the
PP approach in  general  and for  the ENC-PP
approach in particular. My main concerns are
to push away from an ‘isolated brain’ interpret-
ation of PP and to place EPP within a much
broader context of explanation.
2 CI and enculturation
As  I  point  out  in  my  contribution  to  this
volume, cognitive integration should be under-
stood as a thesis about the enculturation of hu-
man cognition. It is a thesis about how phylo-
genetically earlier forms of cognition are built
1 I mean predictions on incoming sensory input relevant to immediate
action in the environment.
2 I think that these levels are real. There is a level of entire popula-
tions, social groups, individual organisms and there is a level of indi-
vidual brains. Cognition takes place within and across (at least the
final three) levels.
upon by more recent cultural innovations (e. g.,
systems of  symbolic  representation).  This  res-
ults in a multi-layered system with heterogen-
eous components, dynamically interwoven into a
co-operative  of  processes  and states  an  integ-
rated  cognitive  system (henceforth  ICS).  The
co-ordination  dynamics  of  the  system are,  at
least in part, understood in terms of the phys-
ical dynamics of brain–body–niche interactions
in real-time; however, they are also to be under-
stood in terms of NPP that govern and determ-
ine those interactions (over time). NPP operate
at both social/population levels and individual,
even sub-personal, levels. They originate as pat-
terns of activity spread out over a population of
agents; consequently they should be understood
primarily as public systems of activity and/or
representation that are susceptible to innovative
alteration, expansion, and even contraction over
time. They are transmitted horizontally across
generational groups and vertically from one gen-
eration to the 3next. At the individual level they
are acquired, most often by learning and train-
ing, and they manifest themselves as changes in
the ways in which individuals  think,  but  also
the ways that they act (intentionally) and the
ways in which they interact with other members
of their social group(s) and the local environ-
ment. NPP, therefore, operate at different levels
(groups  and  individuals)  and  over  different
time-scales (intergenerationally and in the here-
and-now). 
Given this,  it  is  clear  that  What? Now4
processes that reduce prediction errors on their
own could not drive the innovation of NPP; nor
could they determine the properties of NPP on
their own. Less obviously, I would argue, they
do not  drive  the  acquisition  of  NPP,  because
scaffolded  learning  requires  both  a  physically
and temporally-structured learning environment
and the capacity for functional changes to cor-
tical  circuitry  to  be  driven by the  structured
learning environment. The mechanism of acquis-
ition  includes  both  neural  and  environmental
processes working in concert and over long peri-
ods of ontogenetic time. What? Now processes
may help  us  to  understand  the  here-and-now
3 See my target article for examples.
4 Predictions on sensory input in the here-and-now.
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processes  by which  we enact  NPP;  they  may
even tell us something about the neural mech-
anisms  for  learning  and  plasticity;  but  we
should be wary of making prediction and error
minimization  the  driving  factors  behind  the
why and how of enculturation.
Fabry’s commentary focuses on the neural
level,  functioning  in  real-time,  where  the
primary aim is to give a mechanistic account of
how cognitive capacities can be transformed by
learning  and  training  in  rich  socio-cultural
niches. Rather than looking at the origin of ICS
in  cultural  inheritance,  phenotypic  plasticity,
and learning driven plasticity, Fabry argues that
a version of the PP framework can provide the
neural mechanisms by which ICS are (partly)
constructed. My contribution to this volume fo-
cused primarily on the origin of ICS in the re-
cent  cultural  evolution  of  NPP and  then  ex-
plored  how  mathematical  practices  could  be
learnt  and how this  process  of  learning could
drive  functional  changes  to  circuitry  in  the
brain.  Consequently,  the  CI/ENC  framework
pursues the phylogenetic and ontogenetic basis
of  the  larger  brain–body–niche  nexus.  What,
though, of the neural mechanisms of transform-
ation?
I don’t agree with Fabry’s starting premise
that CI/ENC lacks a mechanism of transforma-
tion: the mechanism of transformation is learn-
ing-driven  plasticity  (LDP)  with  neural  re-
deployment  in  a  scaffolded  learning  environ-
ment. The fundamental plasticity of the brain
explains  the  nature  of  neural  transformations
and why the brain is open to scaffolded learning
driven  by  the  environment.  (E)PP  does  not
have the resources to explain redeployment (this
is a theme I take up in the next section). Why
would it, since PP is not a framework for ex-
plaining  redeployment.  It  might  be  the  case
that PP fits with a certain conception of scaffol-
ded  learning⎯such  as  path-dependent  learning,
but  I  have  yet  to  see  a  thorough  working-
through of the details and it’s not clear to me
that all scaffolded learning should be reduced to
a predictive form of path-dependent learning. 
Fabry claims that a dynamical systems ap-
proach to  integration  “does  not  spell  out  the
mutual  influence that  neuronal  and extra-cra-
nial  bodily components have over each other”
(2015, p. 3). The EPP approach is supposed to
fill in the details here. However, I suspect that
this judgement is made a little too quickly, be-
cause  the  dynamical  systems  description  of
brain–body–niche interactions is in one sense a
higher-level  description  of  those  interactions.
The dynamical interactions are described as be-
ing part  of  a  larger  system comprising  brain,
body,  and  niche.  We  can  zoom in  and  focus
upon the dynamics of  brain or  body,  but  we
shouldn’t confuse the dynamics of the brain for
the dynamics of the overall system. I have high-
lighted  and  outlined  the  neural  dynamics  re-
quired for enculturation in a number of places.
For example, in the account of body schema dy-
namics  and in  the  case  of  NPP for  symbolic
cognition, I have outlined the case for dual com-
ponent transformations (e. g., Menary 2007, pp.
78–83;  2010;  2013 and  2014).  Lets  take these
two cases in order.
In a now famous series of studies,  Marav-
ita & Iriki (2004) studied the bimodal interpari-
etal  neurons  in  trained  Japanese  macaque
brains.  These neurons respond both to tactile
stimulation on the hand (tactile receptive field)
and visual stimuli in the same vicinity as the
tactile receptive field (the visual receptive field).
The visual  receptive  field  was centred  on  the
hand  following  it  through  space.  When
macaques where trained to use a rake to pull
food towards them on a table, the observation
that struck Maravita and Iriki was that when
the macaques used the rake the receptive fields
of the bimodal neurons extended along the axis
of the rake, including its head. Iriki’s interpreta-
tion of this is that “either the rake was being
assimilated into the image of the hand or, al-
ternatively, the image of the hand was extend-
ing  to  incorporate  the  tool”  (Iriki &  Sakura
2008,  p.  2230).  The  extension  of  the  body
schema  (receptive  field)  to  include  the  tool
happened only during active holding; it reduced
to just the hand during inactivity. The interest-
ing result of these experiments is that the exist-
ing body schema has the latent capacity to ex-
tend  to  incorporate  the  tool.  LDP  can  be
cashed out in terms of functional changes as the
result of scaffolded learning even in the case of
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macaques,  let  alone  the  notoriously  plastic
brains of humans.
Functional changes can be cashed out in
terms of neural redeployment and cortical con-
nectivity. Returning to the case of mathematical
cognition, inherited systems for numerosity are
evolutionary endowments; we can be reasonably
sure of this because they are constant across in-
dividuals and cultures and they are shared with
other  species.  The  numerosity  systems  are
“quick  and  dirty”;  they  are  approximate  and
continuous,  not  discrete  and  digital.  By  con-
trast, discrete mathematical operations exhibit
cultural and individual variation; there is a big
difference between Roman numerals and Arabic
numerals. They are subject to verbal instruction
(they actually depend on language); one must
learn to count, whereas one does not learn to
subitise.  Mathematics  depends  on  cultural
norms of reasoning (mathematical norms). The
ability to perform exact mathematical calcula-
tions depends on the public system of represent-
ation and its governing norms. We learn the in-
terpretative  practices  and  manipulative  prac-
tices as a part of a pattern of practices within a
mathematics  community,  and  these  practices
transform  what  we  can  do.  They  are  con-
stitutive of our exact calculative abilities. Math-
ematical practices get under our skins by trans-
forming the way that  our existing neural  cir-
cuitry functions.
The relationship between the evolutionar-
ily earlier system and the recent development of
public mathematical systems, norms, and sym-
bols  comes  down to  the  redeployment  of  the
cortical territories that are dedicated to evolu-
tionarily older functions by novel cultural arte-
facts (e. g., representations, tools). The trans-
formation  results  in  new connections  between
the  frontal  lobe  for  number-word  recognition
and association, the temporal lobe for the visual
recognition  of  number  form,  and  the  parietal
lobe  for  the  approximate  recognition  of  mag-
nitudes across both left and right hemispheres
(Dehaene 1997).
The  deeply  transformative  power  of  our
learning histories in the cognitive niche relates
to the development of our capacities for under-
standing symbolic representations and for phys-
ically manipulating inscriptions in public space.
In  learning  to  understand  symbols,  the  first
transformation involves our sensorimotor abilit-
ies  for  creating  and  manipulating  inscriptions
(the transformation of the body schema). This
is something we learn to do on the page and in
the context of a learning environment, in public
space, before we do it in our heads. Our capa-
cities  to  think have  been transformed,  but  in
this instance they are capacities to manipulate
inscriptions in public space. 
It  looks  like  PP  can  provide  models  of
some of  the fundamental processing principles
at work at the sub-personal neural level, but it
is not obvious that it would replace LDP and
neural redeployment in the mechanism of trans-
formation.  However,  Fabry  may  be  right  and
PP may add another string to the bow of our
understanding  of  how  the  brain  exhibits  the
plasticity required for cognitive transformation.
In that case it provides extra explanatory depth
to  the  account  of  enculturation,  but  only  as
part of a much broader explanatory framework.
3 Some worries for enculturated 
predictive coding
Fabry provides  a  persuasive  case  for  how PP
could provide the neural underpinnings of en-
culturation. In this section, however, I will raise
some  problems  for  the  proposed  marriage  of
CI/ENC and PP. The main issues I will address
are as follows:
1. The incompatibility of the isolated brain in-
terpretation (Hohwy 2013) and the active in-
ference interpretation (Clark 2013) of PP.
2. The  attempt  to  explain  all  cognitive  pro-
cessing in terms of prediction error.
3. The redeployment of neural circuitry as not
being explained by PP.
4. The role of NPP as not being explained by
the reduction of prediction error. 
1. Isolating the brain
 
If  CI/ENC has one central  commitment,  it  is
that we should not think of cognition as isol-
ated from the environment. And yet this is ex-
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actly how we ought to understand the predict-
ive brain, according to a prominent interpreta-
tion of  the PP framework.  Whenever  the PP
framework is introduced, it is almost always in-
troduced in the following way: “Accounts of PP
generally  assume  that  human  perception,  ac-
tion,  and  cognition  are  realized  by  Bayesian
probabilistic  generative  models implemented  in
the human brain. Since  the human brain does
not have immediate access to the environmental
causes  of  sensory  effects,  it  has  to  infer  the
most  probable  state  of  affairs  in the  environ-
ment giving rise to sensory data” (Fabry 2015,
p. 4; my emphasis). The two main motivations
for the PP framework are that the brain is isol-
ated from the environment and must  make a
best guess as to what it is perceiving, and that
this kind of probabilistic inference-making res-
ults in internal (neurally realized) models of the
environment.  Putting  aside  the  probabilistic
nature of  the  inferences,  this  just  is  old-fash-
ioned individualism. There is a perceptual inter-
face to an environment of hidden variables; the
internal system creates internal models (repres-
entations) of those hidden environmental vari-
ables,  which then causally produce behaviour.
The  internal  states  must  predict  the  external
variables via sensory input, but they have no
direct access to the causal ancestry of the sens-
ory input. This form of individualism is used as
an explanation for why models and predictions
are required: “Because the brain is isolated be-
hind the veil of sensory input, it is then advant-
ageous for it to devise ways of optimizing the
information  channel  from  the  world  to  the
senses” (Hohwy 2013, p. 238). Hohwy describes
the mind–world relation as “fragile” because of
the isolation of the brain, and this is why active
inference is required. 
The  saving  grace  of  the  PP  framework,
from the perspective of CI/ENC, is active infer-
ence. In Clark’s version of PP active inference
and cultural props help to minimize prediction
errors (Clark 2013); and because of this, there is
a deep continuity between mind and world me-
diated by active inference and the cultural scaf-
folding  of  our  local  niche.  Curiously,  Hohwy
agrees with Clark’s interpretation, but at a cost.
Hohwy agrees that active inference and the cul-
tural  scaffolding  of  the  environment  help  to
change sensory input so as to minimize predic-
tion error, but also “by increasing the precision
of the sensory input” (Hohwy 2013, p. 238). Ac-
cording  to  Hohwy,  the  primary role  of  PP is
perceptual inference; as a matter of “second or-
der statistics” active inference helps to optimise
sensory input so that perceptual inference is less
error-prone. 
Note the cost. First, active inference and
cultural scaffolding is relegated to the secondary
role of reducing prediction error for the primary
cognitive job of  perceptual inference, which is
carried out wholly by matching statistical mod-
els to sensory input in the brain. Second, Ho-
hwy shows that this interpretation of active in-
ference should be understood against the back-
ground of the isolated brain. “The key point I
am aiming at here is that this is a picture that
accentuates the indirect, skull-bound nature of
the  prediction  error  minimization  mechanism”
(Hohwy 2013, p. 238). Organizing and structur-
ing our environments makes sense if the mind–
world relation is fragile in the way that Hohwy
presents  it,  and  also  because  this  structuring
makes perceptual inference more reliable. I take
it that Fabry and Clark would deny this inter-
pretation of the role of active inference and cul-
tural scaffolding. Indeed, Fabry denies Hohwy’s
‘isolationist’ interpretation in her commentary. 
However, Fabry does so by playing up the
roles of  NPP, which go far beyond prediction
minimization:  “Furthermore,  we  need  to  take
into  account  that  genuinely  human  cognitive
processes occur in a culturally sculpted cognit-
ive  niche.  […]  These  cognitive  resources  have
unique properties that render them particularly
useful  for  the  completion  of  cognitive  tasks”
(Fabry 2015, p. 12). She also nods to the sub-
personal, mechanistic role of PP in the entire
brain–body–niche nexus: “[T]he important the-
oretical contribution made by the prediction er-
ror minimization framework is its providing of a
sub-personal, mechanistic description of the un-
derlying  neuronal  and  bodily  sub-processes”
(Fabry 2015, p. 13). It is therefore not clear to
me that PP does anything more than provide
the functional details of some of the neural pro-
cessing in the brain–body–niche nexus. It cer-
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tainly should not be taken to provide a compre-
hensive account of what cognition is and why
there is cultural scaffolding, or what its interest-
ing cognitive properties are.5 It is to these issues
that I shall now turn. 
 
2. Everything is predicted
 
One of the main concerns with the PP approach
is that it is used both to try to explain all of
cognition and as an explanation of why there is
cultural scaffolding. We’ve already seen a brief
hint of this in Hohwy, Clark, and Fabry’s work
above.6 The first worry can be found in the ex-
pression of PP as originating in the free energy
principle:
The free-energy considered here represents
a bound on the surprise inherent in any
exchange with the environment, under ex-
pectations encoded by its state or config-
uration.  A system can minimise free en-
ergy  by  changing  its  configuration  to
change  the  way  it  samples  the  environ-
ment, or to change its expectations. These
changes correspond to action and percep-
tion, respectively, and lead to an adaptive
exchange  with  the  environment  that  is
characteristic  of  biological  systems.  This
treatment implies that the system’s state
and structure encode an implicit and prob-
abilistic model of the environment. (Fris-
ton & Stephan 2007, p. 417)
PP  is  primarily  a  model  of  the  way  in
which top-down processing ‘predicts’ bottom up
sensory input and which samples the environ-
ment to change its expectations. These corres-
pond  to  perception  and  action  respectively7.
However, it seems odd to build a cognitive the-
ory on the basis of the prediction of sensory sig-
5 CI/ENC provides just these motivations and details. Clark himself
proposes  that  the  PP framework  “offers  a  standing  invitation  to
evolutionary, situated, embodied, and distributed approaches to help
‘fill in the explanatory gaps’ while delivering a schematic but funda-
mental account of the complex and complementary roles of percep-
tion, action, attention, and environmental structuring” (Clark 2013,
p. 195).
6 See also their contributions to this volume.
7 There are also theories of attention based upon PP, but I won’t ad-
dress those here.
nals. This is because much of cognition is not
about sensory signal prediction; nor about ac-
tions as sampling the environment. Indeed much
of cognition isn’t  about ‘prediction’ at all.  So
whilst I agree that at least part of the mechan-
isms of cognition can be fruitfully modelled by
PP, not all of them will be. In enculturated sys-
tems, the really important work is being done
by the processing governed by normative pat-
terned  practices  whose  properties  are  under-
stood  primarily  at  the  social  or  populational
level.  I  agree that at the individual level,  the
mechanisms of ICS can partly be explained by
PP, but the main explanatory work will not be
a matter of predictions of sensory input8.
The  examples  from  Landy &  Goldstone
(2007) may be  partly  explained  by prediction
errors, but again this only makes sense in the
context of sensorimotor processing governed by
mathematical norms. If the norms function as
priors in the system, then this might help ex-
plain the errors made by the test subjects. 
 
3.  Phenotypic  plasticity  and  neural  re-
deployment
 
PP can’t explain the redeployment of neural cir-
cuitry to new cognitive functions. And it is not
supposed to, since this isn’t the job it was de-
signed  to  do.  However,  this  is  a  considerable
weakness if PP is supposed to be the primary
mechanism of  enculturation.  I’ve  already  can-
vassed the reasons why in section 1.
 
4.  NPP and  prediction  error  minimiza-
tion
 
Enculturated  PP  plays  a  role  in  the  multi-
layered and interwoven ICS, but it neither de-
termines nor implements the entire system. My
argument in this response has been that the dy-
namics of ICS are not determined by the pre-
dictive processing of parts of the system: if any-
8 Thomas Metzinger has raised an interesting question for me here:
whether there is  continuity between the levels? My argument has
been that there is continuity between the levels, but this continuity
is made possible by NPP’s, LDP and neural redeployment. PP ex-
plains  how we make perceptual  inferences  about  the environment
and it might explain something about the hierarchical organisation
of neural architecture. However, it should be seen as playing a role in
the organisation and enculturation of the brain, not the only role.
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thing PP is enslaved to the processing needs of
the entire enculturated system. The PP frame-
work takes perceptual inference as its primary
mode  of  processing,  which  is  the  top-down
matching of predictions to sensory input. How-
ever,  it  is  not  obvious  that  this  is  the  right
model for all cognitive processing, since it is not
obvious that all  cognitive processing is just a
matter of predictions about sensory input, nor a
hierarchically organised system which minimises
prediction errors. 
For example Hohwy (2013, p. 238) argues
that “many of  the ways we interact with the
world in technical and cultural aspects can be
characterized  by  attempts  to  make  the  link
between the sensory input and the causes more
precise  (or  less  uncertain).”  This  would  be  a
very impoverished account of  the evolution of
public systems of representation. Public systems
of  representation  did  not  simply  evolve  to
“make the link between the sensory input and
the causes more precise (or less uncertain)”; this
would  be  to  ignore  the  social  pressures  that
would have caused representational innovation.9
It might be true that the history of the refine-
ment  of  notation  has  something  to  do  with
making input more easy to ‘predict’; however,
this would not be an  ultimate explanation for
why there are notations in the first place, nor
how  they  function  in  our  cognitive  lives.  It
might be a  proximal explanation of the neural
mechanisms for the processing of notations and
as  such,  it  might  explain  some  of  the  causal
conditions that explain how notations have de-
veloped,  but  it  doesn’t  explain the conditions
under which notations evolved. For further reas-
ons why see section 3.4 of my target article, on
evolutionary  novelty  and  uniqueness  (this
volume).
For example, the idea that the brain pre-
dicts the product of two numerals makes sense,
and the surprise at a product too distant from
the operands lends further credence. Remember
9 I take it that Hohwy is claiming that cultural representations func-
tion so as to make perceptual inferences more precise. This would be
another way of reducing socio-cultural phenomena to a role that is
complementary to the brain, with the processing needs of the brain
dictating the evolutionary path that culture must take. The external-
ist perspective takes it that there are social and cultural pressures
that require cognitive innovations (sometimes even new phenotypes).
the example from section 4.1 of my target art-
icle (this volume) : 34 + 47 = 268. However, it
is  not  obvious that  predictions will  help with
the  second  example:  34 x 47 = 1598.  What  is
required in this instance is  the serial  working
through of  the  multiplication according to an
algorithm.  Furthermore,  this  is  not  simply  a
case of sensory predictions: when it comes to re-
cognising the numerals on the page in front of
you, PP can explain top-down predictions about
sensory input, but that is not at all the same
thing as the working through of a mathematical
problem. So mathematical cognition could not,
it seems to me, be reducible to error minimiza-
tion. 
4 Conclusion: Where now?
Despite some of my concerns about how the PP
framework can be interpreted and its relation to
the  CI/ENC framework,  I  think  that  Fabry’s
account of the enculturation of reading using a
hybrid of CI and EPP is really compelling. This
leads me to think that an EPP account might
by workable for other cases, such as mathemat-
ical cognition. Having said this, the division of
labour between PP and evolutionary accounts
of the origin of NPP and ICS must be in place.
The role of  scaffolded learning and neural re-
deployment  should  not  be  replaced  by  error
minimization processes. The ‘isolationist’ read-
ing of PP should be resisted, and a more situ-
ated cognition friendly approach embraced. PP
is  a  sub-personal  account  of  neural  processes
that fits within a larger account of the brain–
body–niche  nexus.  If  one  embraces  CI/ENC
then  there’s  more  to  the  mind  than  What?
Now. 
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